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ABSTRACT 
We present a method to regenerate diversified code dynamically 
in a Java bytecode JIT compiler, and to update the diversification 
frequently during the execution of the program. This way, we can 
significantly reduce the time frame in which attackers can let a 
program leak useful address space information and subsequently 
use the leaked information in memory exploits. A proof of con-
cept implementation is evaluated, showing that even though code 
is recompiled frequently, we can achieved smaller overheads than 
the previous state of the art, which generated diversity only once 
during the whole execution of a program.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.3.4 [Programming Languages]: Processors—code generation, 
optimization;K.6.5[Management of Computing and Infor-
mation Systems]: Security and Protection—unauthorized access 
General Terms 
 Algorithms, Performance, Experimentation, Security. 
Keywords 
Recompilation, profiles, NOP insertion. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The widespread software monoculture is a major facilitator of 
cyber attacks. Adversaries can target many users with a single 
exploit because they all run the same binaries. One type of code 
reuse attacks, return-oriented programming (ROP) attacks, are 
particularly hard to defeat [1]. Instead of injecting new code into a 
binary, ROP attacks exploit a software vulnerability to execute a 
chain of reusable code snippets called gadgets, thus obtaining 
execution of any wanted functionality. In response, software di-
versity has been proposed [2,12,15]. By randomizing a binary's 
code layout, a memory vulnerability is moved to an a priori un-
known location in the binary, thereby bringing down the probabil-
ity of return-to-libc and return-oriented attacks [1, 2, 6, 21]. 
Many of the current defense practices are passive and static in 
nature. Despite techniques such as Address Space Layout Ran-
domization (ASLR) and Data Execution Prevention (DEP) [3], the 
cat and mouse games between the attackers and defenders there-
fore still go on. In many recent attacks, an attacker first lets the 
program leak information about the code locations in a process' 
memory space, in order to engineer an adapted attack on the fly.  
Just-In-Time (JIT) compilers generate code during the execution 
of the program. This is, e.g., the case for Java, which is first pre-
compiled to bytecode and then later compiled JIT to machine 
code. Similarly, LLVM can first compile code to bitcode, which is 
then later compiled JIT to native code.  
The predictability of JIT compilers makes their security ques-
tionable. In practice, minimal variation is introduced into their 
code generation, e.g., by noise due to sampling-based profiling. 
So every time the same high-level language code is presented to 
the compiler, it emits the same native code. The attackers exploit 
this to their advantage. As JIT compilation fundamentally uses 
executable memory of which the content is dependent on the input 
of the users, i.e., the program to be JIT compiled as well as its 
data, it poses a big security threat. 
In this paper, we propose to harden the security of a Java 
bytecode JIT compiler by regenerating diversified code dynami-
cally. This way, we can significantly reduce the time frame in 
which attackers can let a program leak useful address space in-
formation and subsequently use the leaked information. There are 
two critical timestamps for an attacker in a typical attack model: 
• Time of leakage of useful address space information,  
• Time of use of the leaked information in an exploit. 
If we can randomize either of the timestamps by making use of 
diversity, the attacker will likely fail to build an exploit. We con-
sider two aspects of the randomization: 
• Security: We adaptively insert NOPs to create diversity. 
• Performance: Profile information helps in reducing the 
overhead while pushing the adaptive diversification. 
Using frequent live diversification at random timestamps, we 
intend to randomize the time frame between the above two 
timestamps, as well as regenerate a different diversified variant of 
the binary at these timestamps. With a proof-of-concept imple-
mentation in JikesRVM, we show that while securing the JIT 
compiler further, we also incur smaller overheads as compared to 
static diversification and static re-diversification by making good 
use of profile information of the program. 
While software diversity helps in protecting “diversified” bina-
ries while “one” is compromised, the idea here is to “protect the 
one” too that is risking to be compromised.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides back-
ground on code-reuse attacks, Java JIT spraying and memory 
corruption, and software diversity. Section 3 describes the design 
of the framework and the proposed solution. Section 4 provides an 
evaluation and presents results of the conducted. Related work on 
JIT diversification is discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 
draws conclusions and discusses some future work.  
2. BACKGROUND 
Code reuse attacks allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on a 
compromised machine. In this, the attacker directs the control 
flow through existing code without injecting new executable code. 
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Examples include ROP attacks and return-into-libc attacks. ROP 
attacks, introduced by Shacham [1], allow attackers to execute 
arbitrary code by overflowing the stack with a sequence of return 
addresses pointing to specific parts of the code, called gadgets, in 
the vulnerable program. A gadget is a valid code sequence that 
ends with a return instruction. This allows Turing-complete be-
havior in the target program without injecting and circumvents 
current code injection defenses such as W^X [25].  
In the context of JIT compilers, JIT spraying [17] and similar 
attacks rely on the constants present in the source code emitted 
into the native code by the JIT compiler directly. The current 
state-of-the-art involves encrypting and decrypting these constants 
[14]. Though this avoids JIT spraying, however, adversaries can 
still make use of code-reuse techniques. An attacker can easily 
make use of the ubiquitous JIT compilers to generate new binary 
code having the necessary gadgets to make a malicious attack 
successful. The predictability of the native code produced by the 
JIT compiler, which fundamentally uses executable data, becomes 
a liability for developers, and an advantage for an adversary, that 
has been demonstrated in several attacks on Java run-time envi-
ronments [13,23]. These kinds of attacks can lead to overwriting 
of the stack without actually going beyond the bounds of the data 
structures involved, and rely on the leakage of address space in-
formation as mentioned earlier. To thwart this leakage, we can 
leverage software diversity.  
Software diversification involves the production of functionally 
identical, but syntactically different binaries of the same software. 
A simple, but effective form is code layout randomization. This 
raises the bar for ROP and return-into-libc attacks. Similarly, 
software diversity can prevent collusion attacks that identify new 
functionality or security fixes in updates [22]. Code layout ran-
domization introduces uncertainty in the binary and hence, it 
drives up the complexity of attacks on diversified binaries.  
Diversification can be introduced at various levels of granulari-
ty: instructions, basic blocks, loops, functions, programs, and 
finally systems. Techniques include NOP insertion, instruction 
randomization, stack layout randomization, function permutation, 
block reordering and splitting, heap randomization and so on [12].  
A simple NOP insertion is every effective in the face of a ROP 
attacks, since its insertion shifts the address space information, 
and being completely randomized, it makes it difficult for attack-
ers to chain the gadgets and deploy identical exploits. 
The code layout is randomized by the compiler [2,3,4], using 
virtual machines [5] or through static binary rewriting [6,7]. How-
ever, most such defense techniques rely on static compilers or 
statically generated binaries. Homescu et al. [8] introduced the 
first concept of JIT diversification to support diversification for 
dynamically generated code. Our work is built upon their concept 
and extends it further to support adaptive live dynamic diversifi-
cation. Whereas Homescu et al. randomize code only once, thus 
potentially still allowing attacks based on first leaking addresses 
and then exploiting those addresses, we close this hole by ran-
domizing the code frequently during the program's execution.  
3. DESIGN 
The framework of the adaptive JIT diversification consists of 
two components: First, it builds on profile information generation 
and hot/cold method classification. Secondly, it inserts NOPs 
adaptively. From a security point of view, it suffices to inserts 
NOPs randomly. However, inserting them completely randomly, 
i.e., as frequently on hot code paths as on cold code paths, will 
introduce significant performance overhead. To avoid this, we 
want to concentrate more NOPs in cold code.  
It is rather expensive, however, to collect fine-grained profile 
information to distinguish between hot and code cold blocks with-
in methods already being JIT compiled based on coarse-grained, 
often sample-based information that the VM & JIT already collect 
by default. In fact, letting the JIT compiler insert execution coun-
ters to collect the profile information will typically be much more 
costly than introducing NOPs.  
To prevent this, a key insight is that methods for which suffi-
cient profile information is already available at some point in 
time, no longer need to be profiled. In other words, when methods 
have been recognized as hot enough, they no longer need to be 
profiled. From then on, when such a method is recompiled at ran-
dom intervals to insert NOPs at new randomized places, the JIT 
compiler will insert no more execution counters. 
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Fig. 1: Design Framework of Adaptive JIT Diversification 
       
Fig. 1 shows a schematic diagram of the design. With the pro-
gram executing, profile information is generated at random 
timestamps and hot and cold methods are classified. The recompi-
lation component has a diversification component in it that per-
forms adaptive NOP insertion. Note that the recompilation step 
does not stop the world. The recompilation occurs in a separate 
recompilation thread while the program is still executing. This 
further helps in reducing overheads, and makes the design useful 
for server-side scenarios, where programs are running indefinitely 
and one doesn’t want to deploy stop-the-world techniques to ap-
ply diversification frequently.  The recompilation process is cyclic 
and happens at time random timestamps. 
3.1 Classification of Hot and Cold Methods 
Basic blocks execution counting takes 5 instructions on x86: 2 
for spilling and restoring a register, 2 for loading and storing a 
block's counter value, and 1 for incrementing it. The 4 memory 
operations cause a lot of overhead. Therefore, it makes sense to 
remove the counters as soon as possible. But of course that itself 
requires the generation of profile information. 
Once we are able to “decide” that some method is hot, we have 
ample information, and hence we can at least remove the counters 
for that method’s basic blocks.  But how do we decide if a method 
is hot or cold? To do this, we defined a threshold of execution 
counts. If the execution count overshoots this threshold value, the 
method is classified as hot, else it is considered cold.  
Also, readers must note that the order of recompilation of meth-
ods is important. The hot methods are recompiled first, followed 
by the cold methods, while the program is executing. This order 
of recompilation will lead to better adaptive diversification, as 
well as enhanced security and performance. The latter is explained 
in Fig. 2. Suppose method C is hotter than B, which in turn is 
hotter than A. So method C will be classified as hot first. Suppose 
that has happened some time before ti, while the other methods are 
not (yet) classified as hot. In the compilation order of case 1, the 
execution counters in C will be omitted starting at time ti. In the 
order of case 2, they will only be omitted at time tj. By recompil-
ing the hottest methods first, we hence loose less time.  
Though sorting itself can involve significant overheads, experi-
ments showed that we achieved a slight improvement overall be-
cause the sorting helped in getting the classification done quickly.  
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Fig. 2: Order of the methods’ compilation  
3.2 Adaptive NOP Insertion 
      We use a similar technique of adaptive NOP insertion as 
Homescu et al. [4]. A NOP normally takes 1 CPU cycle. Hence, if 
NOP insertion occurs in a basic block that executes a high number 
of times, it leads to high performance overhead. To deal with this, 
the idea is to insert less NOPs in hot basic blocks and relatively 
more NOPs in cold blocks. As compared to a single probability of 
NOP insertion, we replace this with a range of probabilities. The 
hottest block eventually gets the lowest probability of NOP inser-
tion, and the coldest block gets the highest probability of NOP 
insertion. The intermediate blocks get their NOP insertion proba-
bility based on the following logarithmic function: 
pNOP (x) = pmax − (pmax − pmin )
log(1+ x)
log(1+ xmax )
                  (1) 
where x is the execution count of the current basic block, xmax is 
the maximum execution count in the program and [pmin, pmax] is 
the probability range. For more details, we refer to [4]. 
Our randomized NOP insertion algorithm then is the following: 
 
numNOPs = |NOP Table| 
for i ∈ InstList do 
  gen_rand = random(0.0,1.0) 
  if gen_rand < pNOP(count(i)) then 
    whichNOP = random (0, numNOPs) 
    insert(i, NOP Table [whichNOP]) 
  
The x86 architecture provides 1 to 9 byte-sized NOP codes (Ta-
ble 1), we also use 6 more variants of NOP (Table 2). These 6 
variants preserve the processor state, while minimizing the proba-
bility of creating new gadgets, as the second byte decodes to an 
unusable operand or opcode. For instance, IN (read from an input 
port) requires privileged mode, and hence renders unprivileged 
code to return faults. 
 
Table 1: 1-9 byte sized NOP instructions  
Instruction Encoding
NOP 90
66 NOP 66 90
NOP DWORD ptr [EAX] 0f 1f 00
NOP DWORD ptr [EAX + 00H] 0f 1f 40 00
NOP DWORD ptr [EAX + EAX*1 + 00H] 0f 1f 44 00 00
66 NOP DWORD ptr [EAX + EAX*1 + 00H] 66 0f 1f 44 00 00
NOP DWORD ptr [EAX + 00000000H] 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00
NOP DWORD ptr [EAX + EAX*1 + 00000000H] 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00
66 NOP DWORD ptr [EAX + EAX*1 + 00000000H] 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00  
 
Table 2: Extra NOP variants 
Instruction Encoding Second Byte Decoding
MOV ESP, ESP 89 E4 IN
MOV EBP, EBP 89 ED IN
LEA ESI, [ESI] 8D 36 SS:
LEA EDI, [EDI] 8D 3F ASS
XCHG ESP, ESP 87 E4 IN
XCHG EBP, EBP 87 ED IN  
 
3.3 Adaptive JIT Diversification 
The following recompilation algorithm runs in a separate recom-
pilation thread: 
  
while True do 
  sleep for random(0.0,1.0)*sleepTime 
  sort all methods based on the execution counts  
  for every method in all methods do 
    if method.count > threshold the 
      method.insertBBExecutionCount=False 
    compile method in recompilation thread 
  
This algorithm performs the following steps: 
1. Sleep for random amount of time to randomize diversification 
timestamps.  
2. Sort the unclassified methods in order of execution counts. 
3. Compile them in the sorted order, inserting NOPs while doing 
so using the profile information as discussed above.  
4. If execution counts exceeds threshold value, classify the 
method as hot, and remove its execution counters. 
4. EVALUATION 
We implemented our concept the Jikes Research Virtual Ma-
chine [24]. JikesRVM contains a baseline compiler, which is a 
fast compiler to convert bytecode into native code. We imple-
mented our NOP insertion algorithm in this phase. We intend to 
adapt our solution to the optimizing compiler in our future work.  
The diversifying JIT compiler was tested using the DaCapo 
2009 Benchmarks [9] on a system containing an Intel Core i7-
3610QM CPU @ 2.30GHz with HyperThreading enabled and 
6GB RAM running Fedora 17 with Linux Kernel 3.6.11-
5.fc17.x86_64. Table 3 presents the parameters and compiler op-
tions we added to the JIT compiler used in the experiment. 
 
Table 3: JIT Compiler options added to JikesRVM 
pNOP Probability of NOP insertion in NOP randomization
pMax Maximum probability of adaptive NOP insertion
pMin Minimum probability of adaptive NOP insertion
profile_edgecounters Enable or Disable Basic Block Execution Counters
sleepTime Maximum interval time limit between two recompilations
Threshold Threshold value of Hot/Cold classification
startTime Time before starting recompilation for the first time
enableRecompile Enable/Disable Recompilation  
 
We evaluated three version of JIT diversification: 
• V1: Random NOP insertion in one-time JIT diversification 
• V2: Random NOP insertion in dynamic JIT diversification 
• V3: Adaptive NOP insertion in dynamic JIT diversification 
It is important to note that in this paper, we only present a per-
formance evaluation of the proposed approach. The security eval-
uation for no-op insertion has been studied extensively in litera-
ture [2, 4, 8]. 
We varied the NOP insertion probability [pmin, pmax] between 0-
30%, 10-50% and 25-50% for dynamic JIT diversification for 
versions 2 and 3, while for version 1, we fixed pNOP at 30% and 
50%. We varied the random sleep time and threshold values as 
follows: 
sleep time = {500, 1000, 1500, 2000} 
threshold = {100, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000} 
To find the best configuration for our method for benchmark 
performance evaluation, we averaged out the performance over-
heads for each configuration. To do that, we first fixed pmin and 
pmax as 25% and 50% respectively, and varied the sleep time and 
threshold parameters, keeping one fixed and varying the other. 
For a sleep time value of 1000 and thresholds varying over the 
interval [100, 2000], we observed that all benchmarks showed an 
inverted bell shaped performance overhead curve, i.e., the perfor-
mance overhead first decreases and then increases. We observed 
similar performance overhead patterns for sleep time = 1500 ex-
cept for lusearch which showed strictly decreasing curve. There is 
a considerable change in pattern from sleep time = 500 to sleep 
time = 2000, where the bell shape pattern gets reversed for xalan, 
pmd and sunflow, while jython and luindex exhibited similar pat-
terns of performance overheads. From these observations, we 
computed the sleep time and threshold values where minimal 
overhead was incurred. The best values achieved were sleep time 
= 1000 and threshold = 1000 for a minimal average overhead of 
7.44%. 
We used Eq. (1) to insert the pNOP in the adaptive configuration 
of version 3. For version 2, we take the value of sleep time to be 
1000 because this the value of sleep time for the best configura-
tion in the adaptive system of version 3. The initial pNOP for the 
adaptive version 3, i.e., the pNOP value used for the first compila-
tion when code is not yet known to be hot or cold, was set to 0.1. 
Overall results are shown in Fig 3, in which ST stands for sleep 
time, and T for threshold. The performance overheads for version 
1 are 6.7% and 5.3% for pNOP = 50% and pNOP = 30% respective-
ly. Although version 2 increases this overhead to 10% and 9%, 
version 3 decreases it to 6% and 5% for pNOP = 10-50% and pNOP 
= 0-30% respectively, a reduction of 2x times as compared to 
version 2. It should be noted that the runtime overhead may look 
high for certain benchmarks like xalan. However that is the upper 
limit as observed in extreme cases. Also, the overhead in xalan in 
case of version 3 is comparable to version 2 (~16%). Except for 
jython, observe that adaptive no-op insertion in dynamic JIT di-
versification for pNOP = 0-30% and sleep time and threshold val-
ues of 1000, provides the best performance results among all ver-
sions. In jython, version 1 incurs the least overhead. In all other 
cases, we achieved significant performance improvement with 
version 3, our approach, as compared to version 1 and 2. 
5. RELATED WORK 
Various methods have been proposed to harden JIT compilers 
against code reuse attacks. In this section, we briefly discuss these 
methods and approaches proposed.  
JITSafe [13] applies immediate value elimination and obfusca-
tion to protect against JIT Spray attacks. It reduces the time win-
dow of the JIT compiled code in the executable pages, applies 
immediate value elimination, followed by obfuscation of JIT 
compiled code. The evaluation by the authors show no false posi-
tives, while incurring upon low performance overhead.  
In JITDefender [14], the code pages are marked non-executable 
at the code compilation point. Shortly before the code execution 
point, the pages are marked executable, and shortly after again, 
they are marked back as non-executable. Now, if the attacker 
hijacks the control flow and tries to perform JIT spraying attack, 
the access will be blocked since the VM keeps the code pages 
non-executable.  
INSert, proposed by Wei et al [10] randomized register assign-
ment, randomly transforms all immediate operands, parameters 
and local variables. It also randomly injects trapping snippets into 
the target code to alert the user of intrusion (JIT spraying) besides 
adding randomization as well.  
Yee at al [11] introduced Native Client, a sandboxed execution 
environment, uses fault isolation and a secure runtime. NaCl man-
ages the interfaces through which the system interaction and side 
effects are directed. NaCl originally did not allow dynamic code 
generation. However, this was later introduced in [16] by provid-
ing a more flexible form of software fault isolation. 
      Fine-grained address space layout randomization has been 
proposed to thwart runtime attacks. However, Snow et al [20] 
demonstrated just-in-time code reuse strategy that circumvents 
fine grained ASLR by frequently corrupting a memory disclosure 
to map an application’s memory layout on-the-fly while also dis-
covering gadgets at runtime. Thus a JIT based attack renders 
ASLR useless. 
librando [8] is the first comprehensive work on hardening JIT 
compilers using concept of software diversity. It provides trans-
parent code randomization in JIT compilers. It hooks itself to the 
the memory protection areas of the OS under consideration and 
randomizes newly generated code on the fly, while still preserving 
the calling stack’s contents. Our work is very much based on the 
grounds of this work. 
Niu and Tan proposed a control flow integrity (CFI) approach to 
harden JIT compilers, called RockJIT [19]. RockJIT is built upon 
modular control flow integrity. RockJIT build control flow graph 
from the JIT compiler’s source and updates the control-flow poli-
cy of the JIT compiler dynamically when new code is generated 
on the fly.  
Chobham [21] adopts RockJIT [19] to secure the browser’s 
code and the JIT-compiled code since enforcement of control flow 
integrity (CFI) makes ROP gadget chaining difficult. Build on 
grounds of RockJIT, Chobam further constitutes three methods of 
further hardening of JIT compilers: first, it to improve the preci-
sion of the control flow graph generated by RockJIT, it deploys 
input triggered CGF generation; second, randomizing the order in 
which the callee-saved registers are restored; and third, it allocates 
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Fig.  3: Performance overheads comparison of best results obtained from all three versions evaluated 
 
 
a completely separate heap zone for all critical Javascript objects 
and adding checks to bound the access to these objects. 
Isomeron [20] combines fine-grained code randomization with 
execution path randomization to mitigate typical ROP and JIT-
ROP attacks. The authors further showed that Isomeron exponen-
tially reduces the probability of the attacker to predict the correct 
runtime address of a target ROP gadget. Even usage of a randomi-
zation offset by a single byte reduces the attack success rate to 
50%, even though it provides low entropy. 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We presented a technique for adaptive just-in-time code diversi-
fication while re-randomizing binaries at random time stamps. 
This makes it much harder for adversaries to gain useful layout 
knowledge from leaked information and to exploit that 
knowledge. 
With our experiments, we were able to diversify and re-
diversify programs dynamically and at random timestamps, mak-
ing use of collected profile information as we learn. Still our ap-
proach incurs small overheads, as it performs just as well as one-
time diversification.  
We currently used the baseline compiler in JikesRVM to im-
plement our techniques. As a part of our future work, we intend to 
port the implementation to its advanced optimization system and 
compiler as well. This will allow us to study the overhead of the 
presented technique on fully optimized, hot code. At the same 
time, we will be able to leverage the profile information implicitly 
available when hot code is recompiled by the advanced optimiza-
tion system.  
In addition, we intend to research additional forms of diversifi-
cation, such as basic block reordering and layout, and memory 
layout randomization.  
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